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ABSTRACT
Blockchains have recently been under the spotlight due to
the boom of cryptocurrencies and decentralized applications.
There is an increasing demand for querying the data stored
in a blockchain database. To ensure query integrity, the user
can maintain the entire blockchain database and query the
data locally. However, this approach is not economic, if not
infeasible, because of the blockchain’s huge data size and
considerable maintenance costs. In this paper, we take the
first step toward investigating the problem of verifiable query
processing over blockchain databases. We propose a novel
framework, called vChain, that alleviates the storage and
computing costs of the user and employs verifiable queries to
guarantee the results’ integrity. To support verifiable Boolean
range queries, we propose an accumulator-based authenti-
cated data structure that enables dynamic aggregation over
arbitrary query attributes. Two new indexes are further devel-
oped to aggregate intra-block and inter-block data records for
efficient query verification. We also propose an inverted pre-
fix tree structure to accelerate the processing of a large num-
ber of subscription queries simultaneously. Security analysis
and empirical study validate the robustness and practicality
of the proposed techniques.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Owing to the success of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [1]
and Ethereum [2], blockchain technology has been gaining
overwhelming momentum in recent years. A blockchain is
an append-only data structure that is distributively stored
among peers in the network. Although peers in the network
may not trust each other, a blockchain ensures data integrity
from two aspects. First, powered by the hash chain technique,
data stored on a blockchain are immutable. Second, thanks to
its consensus protocol, a blockchain guarantees that all peers
maintain identical replicas of the data. These cryptograph-
ically guaranteed security mechanisms, together with the
decentralization and provenance properties of a blockchain,
make blockchains a potential technology to revolutionize
database systems [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
From the database perspective, a blockchain can be seen
as a database storing a large collection of timestamped data
records. With widespread adoption of blockchains for data-
intensive applications such as finance, supply chains, and
IP rights management, there is an increasing demand from
users to query the data stored in a blockchain database. For
example, in the Bitcoin network, users may want to find the
transactions that satisfy a variety of range selection predi-
cates, such as “Transaction Fee ≥ $50” and “$0.99M ≤ Total
Output ≤ $1.01M” [8]. In a blockchain-based patent manage-
ment system, users can use Boolean operators to search for
combinations of keywords, such as “Blockchain”∧(“Query”∨
“Search”), in the patents’ abstracts [9]. Whereas many com-
panies, including database giants IBM, Oracle, and SAP, as
well as startups such as FlureeDB [10], BigchainDB [11],
and SwarmDB [12], have devoted their efforts to developing
blockchain database solutions to support SQL-like queries,
all of them assume the existence of a trusted party who can
faithfully execute user queries that are based on a material-
ized view of the blockchain database. However, such a trusted
party may not always exist and the integrity of query results
cannot be guaranteed. Query processing with integrity as-
surance remains an unexplored issue in blockchain research.
In a typical blockchain network [1, 2],1 there are three
types of nodes as shown in Fig. 1: full node, miner, and light
1For ease of exposition, in this paper we focus our discussion on public
blockchains, but the proposed verifiable query techniques can be easily
extended to private blockchains.
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Figure 1: A Blockchain Network
node. A full node stores all the data in the blockchain, includ-
ing block headers and data records. A miner is a full node
with great computing power, responsible for constructing
consensus proofs (e.g., nonce in the Bitcoin blockchain). A
light node stores only block headers, which include the con-
sensus proof and the cryptographic hashes of a block. Note
that the data records are not stored in light nodes.
To ensure the integrity of queries over a blockchain data-
base, the query user could join the blockchain network as a
full node. Then, the user can download and validate the entire
database and process queries locally without compromising
the query integrity. However, maintaining a full copy of the
entire database might be too costly to an ordinary user, as
it requires considerable storage, computing, and bandwidth
resources. For example, the minimum requirements of run-
ning a Bitcoin full node include 200GB of free disk space,
an unmetered broadband connection with upload speeds
of at least 50KB per second, and a running time of 6 hours
a day [13]. To cater to query users with limited resources,
especially mobile users, a more appealing alternative is to
delegate the storage and query services to a powerful full
node, while the query user only acts as a light node to receive
results. Nevertheless, how to ensure the integrity of query
results remains a challenge because full nodes are untrusted
and that is an intrinsic assumption of the blockchain.
To address the aforementioned query integrity issue, in
this paper, we propose a novel framework, called vChain, that
employs verifiable query processing to guarantee the results’
integrity. More specifically, we augment each block with
some additional authenticated data structure (ADS), based on
which an (untrusted) full node can construct and return a
cryptographic proof, known as verification object (VO), for
users to verify the results of each query. The communication
between a query user (light node) and a full node is illustrated
in Fig. 1, whereQ denotes a query request and R denotes the
result set.
It is worth noting that this vChain framework is inspired
by query authentication techniques studied for outsourced
databases [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. However, there are several
key differences that render the conventional techniques in-
applicable to blockchain databases. First, the conventional
techniques rely on a data owner to sign the ADS using a
private key. In contrast, in the blockchain network there is
no data owner. Only the miners can append new data to
the blockchain by constructing consensus proofs according
to the consensus protocol. However, they cannot act as the
data owner because they cannot hold the private key and
sign the ADS. Second, a conventional ADS is built on a fixed
dataset, and such an ADS cannot be efficiently adapted to a
blockchain database in which the data are unbounded. Third,
in traditional outsourced databases, new ADSs can always be
generated and appended, as needed, to support more queries
involving different sets of attributes. However, that would
be difficult due to the immutability of the blockchain, where
a one-size-fits-all ADS is more desirable to support dynamic
query attributes.
Clearly, the design of the ADS is a key issue of the vChain
framework. To address this issue, this paper focuses on
Boolean range queries, which, as illustrated earlier, are com-
monly found in blockchain applications [8, 9]. We propose a
novel accumulator-based ADS scheme that enables dynamic
aggregation over arbitrary query attributes, including both
numerical attributes and set-valued attributes. This newly
designed ADS is independent of the consensus protocol so
that it is compatible with the current blockchain technology.
On that basis, efficient verifiable query processing algorithms
are developed. We also propose two authenticated indexing
structures for intra-block data and inter-block data, respec-
tively, to enable batch verification. To support large-scale
subscription queries, we further propose a query indexing
scheme that can group similar query requests. To summarize,
our contributions made in this paper are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on
verifiable query processing that leverages built-in ADSs
to achieve query integrity for blockchain databases.
• We propose a novel vChain framework, together with a
new ADS scheme and two indexing structures that can
aggregate intra-block and inter-block data records for
efficient query processing and verification.
• We develop a new query index that can handle a large
number of subscription queries simultaneously.
• We conduct a security analysis as well as an empirical
study to validate the proposed techniques. We also ad-
dress the practical implementation issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews existing studies on blockchains and verifiable query
processing. Section 3 introduces the formal problem def-
inition, followed by cryptographic primitives in Section 4.
Section 5 presents our basic solution, which is then improved
by two indexing structures devised in Section 6. The veri-
fiable subscription query is discussed in Section 7. The se-
curity analysis is presented in Section 8. Section 9 presents
the experimental results. Finally, we conclude our paper in
Section 10.
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Figure 2: Blockchain Structure
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly review related studies and discuss
relevant techniques.
Blockchain. Since the introduction of Bitcoin cryptocur-
rency, blockchain technology has received considerable at-
tention from both academia and industry [1, 2, 5]. A blockchain,
which is essentially a special form ofMerkle Hash Tree (MHT) [19],
is constructed as a sequence of blocks. As shown in Fig. 2,
each block stores a list of transaction records and an MHT
built on top of them. The header of each block consists of
four components: (i) PreBkHash, which is the hash of the
previous block; (ii) TS, which is the timestamp when the
block was created; (iii) ConsProof, which is constructed by
the miners and guarantees the consensus of the block; and
(iv) MerkleRoot, which is the root hash of the MHT. The
ConsProof is usually computed based on the PreBkHash and
MerkleRoot, and varies depending on the consensus protocol.
In the widely used Proof of Work (PoW) consensus protocol,
the ConsProof is a nonce computed by the miners such that:
hash(PreBkHash | TS | MerkleRoot | nonce) ≤ Z
where Z corresponds to the mining difficulty. After a miner
finds the nonce, it will pack the new block and broadcast it
to the entire network. Other miners verify the transaction
records and the nonce of the new block and, once verified,
append it to the blockchain.
Significant effort has been made to address the various
issues of blockchain systems, including system protocols [20,
21], consensus algorithms [22, 23], security [24, 25], stor-
age [7], and performance benchmarking [4]. Recently, ma-
jor database vendors, including IBM [26], Oracle [27], and
SAP [28], all have integrated blockchains with their data-
base management systems, and they allow users to execute
queries over blockchains through a database frontend. Be-
sides, many startups such as FlureeDB [10], BigchainDB [11],
and SwarmDB [12], have been developing blockchain-based
database solutions for decentralized applications. However,
they generally separate query processing from the underly-
ing blockchain storage and count on trusted database servers
for query integrity assurance. In contrast, our proposed
vChain solution builds authenticated data structures into
the blockchain structure, so that even untrusted servers can
be enabled to offer integrity-assured query services.
Verifiable Query Processing. Verifiable query process-
ing techniques have been extensively studied to ensure result
integrity against an untrusted service provider (e.g., [14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 29]). Most of the existing studies focus on out-
sourced databases and there are two typical approaches: sup-
porting general queries using circuit-based verifiable com-
putation (VC) techniques and supporting specific queries
using an authenticated data structure (ADS). The VC-based
approach (e.g., SNARKs [30]) can support arbitrary compu-
tation tasks but at the expense of a very high and sometimes
impractical overhead. Moreover, it entails an expensive pre-
processing step as both the data and the query program need
to be hard-coded into the proving key and the verification
key. To remedy this issue, Ben-Sasson et al. [31] have devel-
oped a variant of SNARKs in which the preprocessing step
is only dependent on the upper-bound size of the database
and query program. More recently, Zhang et al. [29] have
proposed a vSQL system, which utilizes an interactive proto-
col to support verifiable SQL queries. However, it is limited
to relational databases with a fixed schema.
The ADS-based approach in comparison is generally more
efficient as it tailors to specific queries. Our proposed solu-
tion belongs to this approach. Two types of structures are
commonly used to serve as an ADS: digital signature and
MHT. Digital signatures authenticate the content of a digi-
tal message based on asymmetric cryptography. To support
verifiable queries, it requires every data record to be signed
and hence cannot scale up to large datasets [14]. MHT, on
the other hand, is built on a hierarchical tree [19]. Each en-
try in a leaf node is assigned a hash digest of a data record,
and each entry in an internal node is assigned a digest de-
rived from the child nodes. The data owner signs the root
digest of MHT, which can be used to verify any subset of
data records. MHT has been widely adapted to various index
structures [15, 16, 17]. More recently, there have been studies
of verifiable queries on set-valued data [32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Another closely related line of research is on verifiable
query processing for data streams [37, 38, 39, 40]. However,
previous studies [38, 39] focus on one-time queries to retrieve
the latest version of streamed data. [40] requires the data
owner to maintain an MHT for all data records and suffers
from long query latency, which is not suitable for real-time
streaming services. On the other hand, subscription queries
over data streams have been investigated in [41, 42, 43]. So far,
no work has considered the integrity issue for subscription
queries over blockchain databases.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
As was explained in Section 1, this paper proposes a novel
vChain framework and studies verifiable query processing
over blockchain databases. Fig. 3 shows the system model
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Figure 3: System Model of vChain
of vChain, which involves three parties: (i) miner, (ii) ser-
vice provider (SP), and (iii) query user. Both the miner and
the SP are full nodes that maintain the entire blockchain
database. The query user is a light node that keeps track of
the block headers only. The miner is responsible for con-
structing the consensus proofs and appending new blocks
to the blockchain. The SP provides query services to the
lightweight user.
The data stored in the blockchain can be modeled as a
sequence of blocks of temporal objects {o1, o2, · · · , on}. Each
object oi is represented by ⟨ti ,Vi ,Wi ⟩, where ti is the times-
tamp of the object, Vi is a multi-dimensional vector that
represents one or more numerical attributes, andWi is a
set-valued attribute. To enable verifiable query processing,
an authenticated data structure (ADS) is constructed and em-
bedded into each block by the miners (to be detailed in Sec-
tions 5-7). We consider two forms of Boolean range queries:
(historical) time-window queries and subscription queries.
Time-Window Queries. Users may wish to search the
records appearing in a certain time period. In such a case,
a time-window query can be issued. Specifically, a time-
window query is in the form of q = ⟨[ts , te ], [α , β], ϒ⟩, where
[ts , te ] is a temporal range selection predicate for the time pe-
riod, [α , β] is a multi-dimensional range selection predicate
for the numerical attributes, and ϒ is a monotone Boolean
function on the set-valued attribute. As a result, the SP re-
turns all objects such that {oi = ⟨ti ,Vi ,Wi ⟩ | ti ∈ [ts , te ]∧Vi ∈
[α , β] ∧ ϒ(Wi ) = 1}. For simplicity, we assume that ϒ is in a
conjunctive normal form (CNF).
Example 3.1. In a Bitcoin transaction search service, each
object oi corresponds to a coin transfer transaction. It con-
sists of a transfer amount stored in Vi and a set of sender/re-
ceiver addresses stored inWi . A user may issue a query q =
⟨[2018-05, 2018-06], [10,+∞], send:1FFYc∧receive:2DAAf⟩
to find all of the transactions happening from May to June of
2018 with a transfer amount larger than 10 and being associ-
ated with the addresses “send:1FFYc” and “receive:2DAAf”.
SubscriptionQueries. In addition to time-window queries,
users can register their interests through subscription queries.
Specifically, a subscription query is in the form of q = ⟨−,
[α , β], ϒ⟩, where [α , β] and ϒ are identical to the query con-
ditions in time-window queries. In turn, the SP continu-
ously returns all objects such that {oi = ⟨ti ,Vi ,Wi ⟩ | Vi ∈
[α , β] ∧ ϒ(Wi ) = 1} until the query is deregistered.
Example 3.2. In a blockchain-based car rental system, each
rental object oi consists of a rental price stored inVi and a set of
textual keywords stored inWi . A user may subscribe to a query
q = ⟨−, [200, 250], “Sedan”∧(“Benz”∨ “BMW”)⟩ to receive all
rental messages that have a price within the range [200, 250]
and contain the keywords “Sedan” and “Benz” or “BMW”.
Additional examples of time-window queries and subscrip-
tion queries can be found in Fig. 3.
Threat Model.We consider the SP, as an untrusted peer
in the blockchain network, to be a potential adversary. Due to
various issues such as program glitches, security vulnerabili-
ties, and commercial interests, the SP may return tampered
or incomplete query results, thereby violating the expected
security of the blockchain. To address such a threat, we adopt
verifiable query processing that enables the SP to prove the
integrity of query results. Specifically, during query process-
ing, the SP examines the ADS embedded in the blockchain
and constructs a verification object (VO) that includes the
verification information of the results. The VO is returned to
the user along with the results. Using the VO, the user can
establish the soundness and completeness of the query results,
under the following criteria:
• Soundness. None of the objects returned as results have
been tampered with and all of them satisfy the query
conditions.
• Completeness. No valid result is missing regarding the
query window or subscription period.
The above security notions will be formalized when we per-
form our security analysis in Section 8.
The main challenge in this model is how to design the ADS
so that it can be easily accommodated in the blockchain struc-
ture while cost-effective VOs (incurring small bandwidth over-
head and fast verification time) can be efficiently constructed
for both time-window queries and subscription queries. We
address this challenge in the next few sections.
4 PRELIMINARIES
This section gives some preliminaries on cryptographic con-
structs that are needed in our algorithm design.
Cryptographic Hash Function. A cryptographic hash
function hash(·) accepts an arbitrary-length string as its in-
put and returns a fixed-length bit string. It is collision resis-
tant and difficult to find two different messages,m1 andm2,
such that hash(m1) = hash(m2). Classic cryptographic hash
functions include the SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 families.
Bilinear Pairing. Let G and H be two cyclic multiplica-
tive groups with the same prime order p. Let д be the gener-
ator of G. A bilinear mapping is a function e : G × G→ H
with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: If u,v ∈ G and e(u,v) ∈ H, then e(ua ,vb ) =
e(u,v)ab for any u,v .
• Non-degeneracy: e(д,д) , 1.
Bilinear pairing serves as a basic operation for the multiset
accumulator as shown later in this paper.
q-StrongDiffie-Hellman (q-SDH)Assumption [44]. Let
pub = (p, G, H, e , д) be a bilinear pairing as described above.
It states that for all polynomials q and for all probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries Adv,
Pr[s ← Zp ;σ = (pub,дs , · · · ,дsq );
(c,h) ← Adv(σ ) : h = e(д,д)1/(c+s)] ≈ 0
q-Diffie-HellmanExponent (q-DHE)Assumption [45].
Let pub = (p, G, д) as described above. It states that for all
polynomials q and for all probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versaries Adv,
Pr[s ← Zp ;σ = (pub,дs , · · · ,дsq−1 ,дsq+1 , · · · ,дs2q−2 );
h ← Adv(σ ) : h = дsq ] ≈ 0
Cryptographic Multiset Accumulator. A multiset is a
generalization of a set in which elements are allowed to occur
more than once. To represent them in a constant size, a cryp-
tographic mulitset accumulator is a function acc(·), which
maps a multiset to an element in some cyclic multiplicative
group in a collision resistant fashion [36].
One useful property of the accumulator is that it can be
used to prove set disjoint. It consists of the following proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• KeyGen(1λ) → (sk,pk): On input a security parameter
1λ , it generates a secret key sk and a public key pk .
• Setup(X ,pk) → acc(X ): On input a multiset X and the
public keypk , it computes the accumulative value acc(X ).
• ProveDisjoint(X1,X2,pk) → π : On input two multisets
X1, X2, where X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, and the public key pk , it
outputs a proof π .
• VerifyDisjoint(acc(X1), acc(X2),π ,pk) → {0, 1}: On in-
put the accumulative values acc(X1), acc(X2), a proof
π , and the public key pk , it outputs 1 if and only if
X1 ∩ X2 = ∅.
More elaborated constructions of the accumulator and the
set disjoint proof will be given in Section 5.2.
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Figure 4: Extended Block Structure
5 BASIC SOLUTION
To enable verifiable queries in our vChain framework, a
naive scheme is to construct a traditional MHT as the ADS
for each block and apply the conventional MHT-based au-
thentication methods. However, this naive scheme has three
major drawbacks. First, an MHT supports only the query
keys on which the Merkle tree is built. To support queries
involving an arbitrary set of attributes, an exponential num-
ber of MHTs need to be constructed for each block. Second,
MHTs do not work with set-valued attributes. Third, MHTs
of different blocks cannot be aggregated efficiently, making it
incapable of leveraging inter-block optimization techniques.
To overcome these drawbacks, in this section we propose
novel authentication techniques based on a new accumulator-
based ADS scheme, which transforms numerical attributes
into set-valued attributes and enables dynamic aggregation
over arbitrary query attributes.
In the following, we start by considering a single object
and focusing on the Boolean time-window query for ease of
illustration (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). We then extend it to the
range query condition (Section 5.3). We discuss the batch
query processing and verification for multiple objects in
Section 6. The subscription query is elaborated in Section 7.
5.1 ADS Generation and Query Processing
For simplicity, this section considers the Boolean query con-
dition on the set-valued attributeWi only. We assume that
each block stores a single object oi = ⟨ti ,Wi ⟩ and use Objec-
tHash to denote MerkleRoot in the original block structure
(Fig. 2).
ADS Generation. Recall that in the proposed vChain
framework, an ADS is generated for each block during the
mining process. It can be used by the SP to construct a veri-
fication object (VO) for each query. To this end, we extend
the original block structure by adding an extra field, named
AttDigest, as shown by the shaded part in Fig. 4. Thus, the
block header consists of PreBkHash, TS, ConsProof, Objec-
tHash, and AttDigest.
To serve as the ADS, AttDigest should have three desired
properties. First, AttDigest should be able to summarize an
object’s attributeWi in a way that it can be used to prove
whether or not the object matches a query condition. In case
of a mismatch, we can just return this digest instead of the
whole object. Second, AttDigest should be in a constant size
regardless of the number of elements inWi . Third, AttDi-
gest should be aggregatable to support batch verification of
multiple objects within a block or even across blocks (Sec-
tion 6). As such, we propose to use multiset accumulator as
AttDigest:
AttDiдesti = acc(Wi ) = Setup(Wi ,pk)
While its supported functionalities, including ProveDisjoint(·)
and VerifyDisjoint(·), have been described in Section 4, for
better readability, we defer detailed constructions to Sec-
tion 5.2.
Verifiable Query Processing. Given a Boolean query
condition and a data object, there are only two possible out-
comes: match or mismatch. The soundness of the first case
can be easily verified by returning the object as a result, since
its integrity can be authenticated by the ObjectHash stored
in the block header, which is available to the query user on
a light node (recall Fig. 3). The challenge lies in how to effec-
tively verify the second case by using AttDigest. As CNF is a
Boolean function expressed in a list of AND of OR operators,
we can view the Boolean function in CNF as a list of sets.
For example, a query condition “Sedan”∧(“Benz”∨ “BMW”)
is equivalent to two sets: {“Sedan”} and {“Benz”, “BMW”}.
Consider a mismatching object oi : {“Van”, “Benz”}. It is
easy to observe that there exists an equivalence set (i.e.,
{“Sedan”}) such that its intersection with the object’s at-
tribute is empty. Thus, we can apply ProveDisjoint({“Van”,
“Benz”}, {“Sedan”},pk) to generate a disjoint proof π as the
VO for the mismatching object. Accordingly, the user can
retrieve AttDigesti = acc({“Van”, “Benz”}) from the block
header and use VerifyDisjoint(AttDigesti , acc({“Sedan”}), π ,
pk) to verify the mismatch. The whole process is detailed in
Algorithm 1.
It is straightforward to extend the above algorithm to
support time-window queries. The process basically finds
the corresponding blocks whose timestamp is within the
query window and invokes Algorithm 1 repeatedly for each
object in these selected blocks. For example, suppose the
query Boolean function is “Sedan”∧(“Benz”∨ “BMW”). The
list of objects that are within the time window includes o1:
{“Sedan”, “Benz”},o2: {“Sedan”, “Audi”},o3: {“Van”, “Benz”},
and o4: {“Van”, “BMW”}. The SP can apply ProveDisjoint(·)
for o2, o3, and o4 to prove that they do not match the con-
dition “Benz” ∨ “BMW”, “Sedan”, and “Sedan”, respectively.
As for o1, the SP will return the object directly since it is
a match.
5.2 Constructions of Multiset Accumulator
We now discuss two possible constructions of the multiset
accumulator used as AttDigest in Section 5.1. Each construc-
tion has its own advantage and disadvantage, and is suitable
to different application scenarios as we will see in Section 9.
5.2.1 Construction 1. We first present a construction pro-
posed in [32], which is based on bilinear pairing and q-SDH
Algorithm 1: Verifiable Query on a Single Object
ADS Generation (by the miner)
for each object oi = ⟨ti ,Wi ⟩ do
AttDigesti ← acc(Wi );
Write ⟨hash(oi ),AttDigesti ⟩ to the block;
VO Construction (by the SP)
Function VOConstruction(oi ,q)
Input: Object oi , Query condition q = ⟨ϒ⟩
if oi matches q then Send oi to the user;
else
Interpret ϒ as a list of sets {ϒ1, · · · , ϒℓ}, s.t.
ϒ = ∧ϒi ∈{ϒ1, · · · ,ϒℓ }(∨x ∈ϒi x);
Find ϒi such that ϒi ∈ {ϒ1, · · · , ϒℓ} ∧ ϒi ∩Wi = ∅;
π ← ProveDisjoint(Wi , ϒi ,pk);
Send ⟨π , ϒi ⟩ to the user;
Result Verification (by the user)
if oi matches q then
Check oi w.r.t. hash(oi ) from the block header;
Check whether oi matches q;
else
Read AttDigesti from the block header;
Run VerifyDisjoint(AttDigesti , acc(ϒi ),π ,pk);
assumption. It consists of the following algorithms.
KeyGen(1λ) → (sk,pk): Let (p, G, H, e , д) be a bilinear
pairing. Choose a random value s ← Zp . The secret key is
sk = (s) and the public key is pk = (д,дs ,дs2 , · · · ,дsq ).
Setup(X ,pk) → acc(X ): The accumulative value for a
multiset X = {x1, · · · ,xn} is acc(X ) = дP (X ) = д
∏
xi ∈X (xi+s).
Owing to the property of the polynomial interpolation, it
can be computed without knowing the secret key.
ProveDisjoint(X1,X2,pk) → π : According to the extended
Euclidean algorithm, if X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, there exist two poly-
nomials Q1,Q2 such that P(X1)Q1 + P(X2)Q2 = 1. As such, if
X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, the proof can be computed as π = (F ∗1 , F ∗2 ) =
(дQ1 ,дQ2 ).
VerifyDisjoint(acc(X1), acc(X2),π ,pk) → {0, 1}: To verify
the proof, the verifier interprets π as (F ∗1 , F ∗2 ). The proof is
valid if and only if the following constraint holds:
e(acc(X1), F ∗1 ) · e(acc(X2), F ∗2 ) ?= e(д,д).
5.2.2 Construction 2. Inspired by [35], the second construc-
tion is proposed to introduce two additional Sum(·) and Proof-
Sum(·) primitives, which allow the aggregation of multiple
accumulative values or set disjoint proofs. It is based on bi-
linear pairing and q-DHE assumption and consists of the
following algorithms.
KeyGen(1λ) → (sk,pk): Let (p, G, H, e , д) be a bilinear
pairing. Choose a random value s ← Zp . The secret key is
sk = (s) and the public key is pk = (д, дs , дs2 , · · · , дsq−1 , дsq+1 ,
· · · , дs2q−2 ).
Setup(X ,pk) → acc(X ): The accumulative value for a mul-
tiset X = {x1, · · · ,xn} is acc(X ) = (dA(X ),dB (X )), where
dA(X ) = дA(X ) = д
∑
xi ∈X s
xi anddB (X ) = дB(X ) = д
∑
xi ∈X s
q−xi .
Similar to the first construction, it can also be computed
without knowing the secret key using the polynomial inter-
polation.
ProveDisjoint(X1,X2,pk) → π : It is easy to see that if
X1 ∩X2 = ∅, then Csq < A(X1)B(X2), where C is a non-zero
constant. As such, ifX1∩X2 = ∅, the proof can be computed
as π = дA(X1)B(X2) = д(
∑
xi ∈X1 s
xi )(∑xj ∈X2 sq−xj ).
VerifyDisjoint(acc(X1), acc(X2),π ,pk) → {0, 1}: To ver-
ify the proof, the verifier interprets acc(X1) and acc(X2)
as (dA(X1),dB (X1)) and (dA(X2),dB (X2)), respectively. The
proof is valid if and only if the following constraint holds:
e(dA(X1),dB (X2)) ?= e(π ,д).
Sum(acc(X1), acc(X2), · · · , acc(Xn)) → acc(∑ni Xi ): On
input of multiple accumulative values acc(X1), · · · , acc(Xn),
it outputs the accumulative value for the multiset
∑n
i Xi .
acc(∑ni Xi ) = (dA(∑ni Xi ),dB (∑ni Xi )), where dA(∑ni Xi ) =∏n
i dA(Xi ) and dB (
∑n
i Xi ) =
∏n
i dB (Xi ).
ProofSum(⟨π1,Xπ1,1,Xπ1,2⟩, · · · , ⟨πn ,Xπn,1,Xπn,2⟩) → π ′:
On input of multiple set disjoint proofs π1 = ProveDisjoint(
Xπ1,1, Xπ1,2, pk), · · · , πn = ProveDisjoint(Xπn,1, Xπn,2,pk),
it outputs an aggregate proof π ′ =
∑n
i=1 πi , if and only if
Xπ1,2 = Xπ2,2 = · · · = Xπn,2.
Compared with Construction 1, Construction 2 supports
the aggregation of multiple accumulative values or set dis-
joint proofs, which can be used by the online batch verifica-
tion method in Section 6.3. However, it incurs a much larger
key size. In particular, the public key size in Construction
1 is linear to the largest multiset size, whereas in Construc-
tion 2, the public key size is linear to the largest possible
value of the attributes in the system. In real-life applications,
the common practice is to use a cryptographic hash function
to encode each attribute value into an integer number, which
is then accepted by the accumulator. Since the value returned
by a typical hash function is in several hundreds of bits, it
is costly to generate and publish the public key with such a
scale in advance. To remedy this issue, we may introduce a
trusted oracle, which owns the secret key and is responsible
to answer requests of the public key. Such an oracle can be
acted by a trusted third party or be implemented utilizing
secure hardware like SGX.
5.3 Extension to Range Queries
The previous sections mainly consider the Boolean queries
on the set-valued attributeWi . In many scenarios, the user
may also apply range conditions on the numerical attributesVi .
To tackle this problem, we propose a method that transforms
numerical attributes into set-valued attributes. Then, a range
query can be mapped to a Boolean query accordingly.
∗
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000 001
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Figure 5: Example of Transformation
The idea goes as follows. First, we represent each numeri-
cal value in the binary format. Next, we transform a numer-
ical value into a set of binary prefix elements (denoted as
function trans(·)). For example, a value 4 can be represented
in the binary format 100. Thus, it can be transformed into a
prefix set, i.e., trans(4) = {1∗, 10∗, 100}, where ∗ denotes the
wildcard matching operator. Similarly for a numerical vector,
we can apply the above procedure for each dimension. For ex-
ample, a vector (4, 2) has the binary format (100, 010). Thus,
its transformed prefix set is {1∗1, 10∗1, 1001, 0∗2, 01∗2, 0102}.
Note that here each element has a subscript notation (i.e., 1
and 2), which is used to distinguish the binary values in the
different dimensions of the vector.
Next, we transform a range query condition into a mono-
tone Boolean function, by using a binary tree built over
the entire binary space (e.g., Fig. 5 shows a tree of single-
dimension space [0,7]). Specifically, for a single-dimension
range [α , β], we first represent α and β in its binary format.
Next, we view α and β as two leaf nodes in the tree. Finally,
we find the minimum set of tree nodes to exactly cover the
whole range [α , β]. The transformed Boolean function is a
function concatenating each element in the set using OR (∨)
semantic. For example, for a query range [0, 6], we can find
its transformed Boolean function as 0 ∗ ∨10 ∗ ∨110 (see the
gray nodes in Fig. 5). As discussed in Section 5.1, the equiva-
lence set of this Boolean function is {0∗, 10∗, 110}. Similarly,
in the case of a multi-dimensional range, the transformed
Boolean function is the one concatenating the partial Boolean
function for each dimension using AND (∧) semantic. For
example, a query range [(0, 3), (6, 4)] can be transformed to
(0∗1 ∨ 10∗1 ∨ 1101) ∧ (0112 ∨ 1002), with equivalence sets of
{0∗1, 10∗1, 1101} and {0112, 1002}.
With the above transformations, a query of whether or
not a numerical value vi is in a range [α , β] becomes a
Boolean query of vi ’s transformed prefix set against [α , β]’s
equivalence sets. In the above examples, 4 ∈ [0, 6] since
{1∗, 10∗, 100}∩{0∗, 10∗, 110} = {10∗} , ∅; (4, 2) < [(0, 3), (6,
4)] since there exists some equivalence set {0112, 1002} such
that {0112, 1002} ∩ {1∗1, 10∗1, 1001, 0∗2, 01∗2, 0102} = ∅.
Thanks to the data transformation technique, in the sequel
we unify the two types of query conditions into a uniform
Boolean query condition on the set-valued attribute. More
specifically, for each data object ⟨ti ,Vi ,Wi ⟩, it is transformed
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Figure 6: Intra-Block Index
into a tuple ⟨ti ,W ′i ⟩, whereW ′i = trans(Vi )+Wi ; and a query
q = ⟨[ts , te ], [α , β], ϒ⟩ is transformed into ⟨[ts , te ], ϒ′⟩, where
ϒ′ = trans([α , β]) ∧ ϒ. As such, the query results are {oi =
⟨ti ,W ′i ⟩ | ti ∈ [ts , te ] ∧ ϒ′(W ′i ) = 1}.
6 BATCH VERIFICATION
In this section, we discuss how to boost the query perfor-
mance via batch verification. We first introduce two authen-
ticated indexing structures, namely intra-block index (Sec-
tion 6.1) and inter-block index (Section 6.2), followed by
an online batch verification method (Section 6.3). All these
techniques allow the SP to prove mismatching objects in
a batch.
6.1 Intra-Block Index
In the previous discussion, we assume that each block stores
only one object for simplicity. In general, each block often
stores multiple objects. Naively, we can apply the single-
object algorithm repeatedly for each object to ensure query
integrity, which however incurs a verification complexity
linear to the number of objects. Further, it can be observed
that if two objects share some common attribute value, they
may mismatch some queries due to the same partial query
condition. Therefore, to reduce the proofing and verifica-
tion overhead, we propose an intra-block index which can
aggregate multiple objects and improve performance.
Fig. 6 shows a block of the blockchain with the intra-block
index. It organizes the ObjectHash and AttDigest of each ob-
ject into a binary Merkle tree. The block header consists of
the following components: PreBkHash, TS, ConsProof, and
MerkleRoot, where MerkleRoot is the root hash of the bi-
nary Merkle tree. Each tree node has three fields: child hash
(denoted by hashi , and is used to form the MHT), attribute
multiset (denoted byWi ), and attribute multiset’s accumula-
tive value (denoted by AttDigesti ). They are computed from
the child nodes as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Intra-Block Index Non-Leaf Node). Let hash(·)
Algorithm 2: Intra-Index Construction (by the miners)
Function BuildIntraIndex(nodes)
Input: list of leaf nodes nodes
while nodes .len > 1 do
newnodes ← [];
while nodes .len > 1 do
nl ← argmax
n
|Wn |; nodes .delete(nl );
nr ← argmax
n
|Wnl ∩Wn |
|Wnl ∪Wn |
; nodes .delete(nr );
Wn ←Wnl ∪Wnr ;
AttDiдestn ← acc(node .W );
hn ← hash(hash(hashnl |hashnr )|AttDiдestn );
newnodes .add(⟨nl ,nr ,hn ,Wn ,AttDiдestn⟩);
nodes ← newnodes + nodes;
root← nodes[0];
MerkleRoot ← hashr ;
be a cryptographic hash function, ‘|’ be the string concate-
nation operator, acc(·) be the multiset accumulator, nl and
nr be the left and right children of node n, respectively. The
fields for a non-leaf node n are defined as:
• Wn =Wnl ∪Wnr
• AttDiдestn = acc(Wn)
• hashn = hash(hash(hashnl | hashnr ) | AttDiдestn)
Definition 6.2 (Intra-Block Index Leaf Node). The fields for
a leaf node are identical to those for the underlying object.
When building the intra-block index, we want to achieve
the maximum proofing efficiency. That is, we aim to maxi-
mize the chance of pruning the mismatching objects together
during query processing. On the one hand, this means that
we should find a clustering strategy such that given a user’s
query, the chance that a node mismatches the query is maxi-
mum. In another words, we strive to maximize the similarity
of the objects under each node. On the other hand, a balanced
tree is preferred since it can improve the query efficiency.
Thus, we propose that the intra-block index is built based
on the block’s data objects in a bottom-up fashion (by the
blockchain miners). First, each data object in the block is
assigned to a leaf node. Next, the leaf nodes which yield
the maximum Jaccard similarity |Wnl ∩Wnr ||Wnl ∪Wnr | are iteratively
merged. The two merged tree nodes are used to create a new
non-leaf node in the upper level. This process is repeated in
each level until the root node is created. Finally, the Merkle-
Root assigned byhashr is written as one of the components of
the block header. Algorithm 2 shows the procedure in detail.
With the above intra-block index, the SP can process a
query as a tree search. Starting from the root node, if the
attribute multiset of the current node fulfills the query con-
dition, its subtree will be further explored. Also, the corre-
sponding AttDigest is added to the VO, which will be used to
Algorithm 3: Query w. Intra-Index (by the SP)
Function IntraIndexQuery(root ,q)
Input: Intra-Index root root , Query condition q = ⟨ϒ⟩
Output: Query Result R, Verification Object VO
Create an empty queue queue;
queue .enqueue(root );
while queue is not empty do
n ← queue .dequeue();
ifWn matches q then
if n is a lea f node then Add on to R;
else
Add ⟨AttDiдestn⟩ to VO;
queue .enqueue(n.children);
else
Find query condition set ϒi w.r.t.Wn (see Alg. 1);
π ← ProveDisjoint(Wn , ϒi ,pk);
add ⟨hashn ,π , ϒi ,AttDiдestn⟩ to VO;
return ⟨R,VO⟩;
reconstruct theMerkleRoot during result verification. On the
other hand, if the multiset does not satisfy the query condi-
tion, it means that all the underlying objects are mismatches.
In this case, the SP will invoke ProveDisjoint(·) with the cor-
responding AttDigest to generate a mismatch proof. Upon
reaching a leaf node, the object whose multiset satisfies the
query condition is a matching object and will be returned
as a query result. Algorithm 3 shows the VO construction
using the intra-block index.
For illustration, we use the same set of objects as discussed
in Section 5.1. The intra-block index is shown in Fig. 6. The
Boolean query from the user is “Sedan”∧(“Benz”∨ “BMW”).
The query process simply traverses the index from the root
node to the leaf nodes. The query result is {o1}. The VO
returned by the SP includes {⟨AttDiдestr ⟩, ⟨AttDiдest5⟩,
⟨hash2, π2, {“Audi”}, AttDiдest2⟩, ⟨hash6, π6, {“Van”},
AttDiдest6⟩}. Here π2 and π6 are two disjoint proofs of the
mismatching nodes N2 and N6 (shaded in Fig. 6), respectively.
Note that AttDiдestr and AttDiдest5 will only be used to
reconstruct the MerkleRoot during result verification. On
the user side, the mismatch verification works by invoking
VerifyDisjoint(·) using the AttDigest, the disjoint set, and the
proof π in the VO. Further, in order to verify the result sound-
ness and completeness, the user is required to reconstruct the
MerkleRoot and compare it with the one read from the block
header. In our example, firstly, VerifyDisjoint(·) is invoked us-
ing ⟨π2, AttDiдest2, {“Audi”}⟩ and ⟨π6, AttDiдest6, {“Van”}⟩
to prove that nodes N2 and N6 indeed mismatch the query.
After that, the user computes hash(o1) using the returned
result, and hash5 = hash(hash(o1) | hash2 | AttDiдest5),
hashr = hash(hash5 | hash6 | AttDiдestr ) based on the VO.
Finally, the user checks the newly computed hashr against
the MerkleRoot in the block header.
Algorithm 4: Query w. Inter-Index (by the SP)
Function InterIndexQuery(block,q)
Input: Current Block block , Query condition q = ⟨ϒ⟩
Find Jump ← False;
for Li from Lmax to Lmin of block .SkipList do
ifWLi does not match q and Find Jump , True then
Find query condition set ϒi w.r.t.Wn ;
π ← ProveDisjoin(WLi , ϒi ,pk);
add ⟨PreSkippedHashLi ,π , ϒi ,AttDigestLi ⟩ and all
hashLj ∈ SkipList , j , i to VO;
block ← Skip(i); Find Jump ← True;
if Find Jump = False then
IntraIndexQuery(block .root ,q);
block ← block .prev ;
InterIndexQuery(block,q);
6.2 Inter-Block Index
Besides similar objects within the same block, the objects
across blocks may also share similarity andmismatch a query
due to the same reason. Based on this observation, we build
an inter-block index that uses a skip list to further optimize
the query performance.
As shown in Fig. 7, the inter-block index consists of mul-
tiple skips, each of which skips an exponentially number
of previous blocks. For example, the list may skip previous
2, 4, 8, · · · blocks. For each skip, it maintains three compo-
nents: the hash of all skipped blocks (denoted by
PreSkippedHashLk ), the sum of the attribute multisets for
the skipped blocks (denoted byWLk ), and the corresponding
accumulative value w.r.t.WLk (denoted by AttDigestLk ). Note
that here we use the summation of attribute multisets to en-
able online aggregate authentication in Section 7. Finally,
the inter-block index is written into the block using an extra
field SkipListRoot, which is defined as:
• SkipListRoot = hash(hashL2 | hashL4 | hashL8 | · · · )
• hashLk = hash(PreSkippedHashLk | AttDigestLk )• AttDigestLk = acc(WLk )
• WLk =
∑i
j=i−k+1Wj
During the query processing, an eligible skip may be used
to represent multiple blocks which do not contribute to query
results due to the same reason of mismatching. As the user
can avoid accessing these skipped blocks, the verification
cost can be reduced.
Algorithm 4 shows the query processing procedure with
the inter-block index. We start with the latest block in the
query time window. We iterate the skip list from the max-
imum skip to the minimum skip. If the multiset of a skip
WLi does not match the query condition, it means that all
the skipped blocks between the current block and the pre-
vious i-th block do not contain matching results. Therefore,
ProveDisjoint(·) is invoked and output the mismatch proof
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πi . Then, ⟨PreSkippedHashLi , πi , ϒi , AttDigestLi ⟩ are added
to the VO. The user can use this proof to verify that the
skipped blocks indeed mismatch the query. Meanwhile, other
hashes except hashLi are also added to the VO. If we fail to
find mismatching blocks during the iteration, the function
IntraIndexQuery(·) (Algorithm 3) is invoked for the cur-
rent block and then the previous block is examined next.
If we successfully find a mismatch skip, the correspond-
ing preceding block will be examined next. The function
InterIndexQuery(·) is invoked recursively until we com-
plete checking all the blocks within the query window. Note
that we can combine the intra-block index and inter-block
index to maximize performance since they are not in conflict.
6.3 Online Batch Verification
Recall that the proposed intra-block index attempts to clus-
ter the objects of the same block in a way to maximize the
proofing efficiency of mismatching objects. Nevertheless,
some objects/nodes indexed in different blocks or even dif-
ferent subtrees of the same block may also share the same
reason of mismatching. Therefore, it would be beneficial
to aggregate such objects/nodes online for more efficient
proofing. To do so, the Sum(·) primitive introduced by Con-
struction 2 in Section 5.2, which outputs the accumulative
value of the aggregated multiset when given multiple ac-
cumulative values, can be applied. In our running example
shown in Fig. 6, suppose that o2 and o4 share the same rea-
son for mismatching a query condition (“Benz”). Then, the
SP can return π = ProveDisjoint(W2 +W4, {“Benz”},pk) and
AttDigest2,4 = Sum(acc(W2), acc(W4)). And the user can ap-
plyVerifyDisjoint(AttDigest2,4, acc({“Benz”}),π ,pk) to prove
that these two objects mismatch in a batch.
7 VERIFIABLE SUBSCRIPTION QUERIES
A subscription query is registered by the query user and
continuously processed until it is deregistered. Upon seeing a
newly confirmed block, the SPwill need to publish the results
to registered users, together with VOs. In this section, we first
propose a query index to efficiently handle a large number
of subscription queries (Section 7.1). After that, we develop a
lazy authentication optimization that delaysmismatch proofs
to reduce the query verification costs (Section 7.2).
7.1 Query Index for Scalable Processing
As discussed earlier, the majority of the query processing
overhead comes from generating the proofs for mismatching
objects at the SP. Fortunately, a mismatching object could
have the same reason of mismatching for different subscrip-
tion queries. Thus, a mismatch proof can be shared by such
queries. Inspired by [41], we propose to build an inverted
prefix tree, called IP-Tree, over subscription queries. It is es-
sentially a prefix tree with reference to inverted files for
both the numerical range condition and also the Boolean
set condition.
Prefix Tree Component. To index the numerical ranges
of all subscription queries, the IP-Tree is built on the basis of
a grid tree such that each tree node is represented by a CNF
Boolean function (see Section 5.3). For example, the grid node
N1 in Fig. 8, corresponding to the upper-left cell ([0, 2], [1, 3]),
is denoted by {0∗1 ∧ 1∗2}. The root node of the prefix tree
covers the entire range space of all subscription queries.
Inverted File Component. Each node of the IP-Tree is
associated with an inverted file that is constructed based on
the subscription queries indexed under the node. There are
two subcomponents for each inverted file:
• Range Condition Inverted File (RCIF). Each entry in
the RCIF has two attributes: query qi and its cover type
(i.e., full or partial). All the queries in the RCIF intersect
the numerical space S of the node. The cover type indi-
cates whether qi fully covers or partially covers S. The
RCIF is used to check the mismatch of the numerical
range condition.
• Boolean Condition Inverted File (BCIF). The BCIF
records only the queries that fully cover the node’s space.
Each entry in the BCIF consists of two attributes: query
condition set ϒ and corresponding queries. The BCIF is
used to check the mismatch of the Boolean set condition.
We use Fig. 8 as an example to illustrate how to construct
the IP-Tree. It is built in a top-down fashion by the SP. We
first create the root node and add all queries to its RCIF as
partial-cover queries. We then split the root node and create
four equally-spaced child nodes. For each child node, if a
query fully or partially covers the node’s space, it will be
added to the node’s RCIF . Also, the equivalence sets of a
full-cover query will be added to the node’s BCIF . Take N1
as an example. While queries q1 and q2 fully cover this node,
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Figure 8: Inverted Prefix Tree
query q3 only partially covers it. Thus, the RCIF contains
three intersection queries q1, q2, and q3. The cover types of
q1 and q2 are full and for q3 the type is partial. As for the
BCIF of N1, q1 and q2 share the equivalence set {“Van”}, and
the sets {“Benz”} and {“BMW”} correspond to queries q1
and q2, respectively. Next, since q3 only partially covers N1,
we further split N1 into four sub-cells. As q3 fully covers
N7, it is added to the RCIF and BCIF of N7. The algorithm
terminates when no partial query is found in any leaf node.
When a query is registered or deregistered, we update the
IP-Tree’s nodes corresponding to the numerical range of the
query. We may also split or merge the tree nodes if necessary.
Note that, to prevent the tree from becoming too deep, we
switch back to the case without the IP-Tree when the tree
depth reaches some pre-defined threshold.
With the IP-Tree index, the subscription queries can be
processed as a tree traversal. We first use an example of
single object to illustrate the basic idea. Upon arrival of a
new object o, the IP-Tree is traversed along the path from
the root to the leaf node that covers o. For any node nq
on the traversal path, the associated queries can be found
from nq ’s RCIF . These queries can be classified into three
categories: (1) a full-cover query whose equivalence set(s) in
nq ’s BCIF match o (thus o is added as a result of this query);
(2) a full-cover query whose equivalence set(s) in nq ’s BCIF
mismatch o (thus ProveDisjoint(·) is invoked and a disjoint
proof is generated for this query); (3) a partial-cover query
(no further action is needed). In addition, we identify the
queries that appear in nq ’s parent’s RCIF but not in nq ’s.
Those queries mismatch the numerical range condition for
o and thus also a disjoint proof is generated for them. Next,
nq ’s child node will be processed and this process continues
until we reach a leaf node or all queries have been classified
as matching or mismatching. Consider a new object oi =
⟨ti , (0, 2), {“Van”, “Benz”}⟩ = ⟨ti , {001, 102, “Van”, “Benz”}⟩
shown in Fig. 8. At N1, q1 is classified as a matching query,
Algorithm 5: Subscription Query w. Lazy Authentication (by
the SP)
Function SubscribeInterIndexQuery(block,q,VO, s)
Input: Block block , Query condition q = ⟨ϒ⟩, Partial VO,
Stack s
Wr ← block .root .Wr ;
ifWr matches q then
⟨R,VOb ⟩ ←IntraIndexQuery(block .root ,q);
VO← VO + VOb ; Send ⟨R,VO⟩ to user;
Empty partial VO and s;
else
VOb ←IntraIndexQuery(block .root ,q);
ifWr has the same mismatch attributes with s then
Find the maxiumn skip Li s.t. it coversm elements
on top of s;
if Li is found then
⟨blocki , JumpDistancei ⟩ ← s[i],∀i ∈ {m};
Popm elements of s;
Rewind partial VO to blockm ;
Add VOb , AttDigestLi and other hashes to VO;
s .push(⟨block,∑mi JumpDistancei ⟩);
else s .push(⟨block, 1⟩);
else
Empty s; s .push(⟨block, 1⟩);
q2 and q4 mismatch because of the Boolean set condition
and the numerical range condition, respectively, whereas q3
is not confirmed as mismatching until we check N1’s child
node N7.
This idea can be easily extended to a new block of objects
that are indexed by an intra-block index. We start from the
root of the intra-block index. For any index node nb , we treat
it as a super object and apply the above query processing
procedure. The only difference is that if a full-cover query
is classified as matching, we cannot immediately return the
current node nb as a query result, but to further recursively
check its child nodes until reaching the leaf nodes. In the
interest of space, the pseudo codes of the detailed algorithms
are given in Appendix A.
7.2 Lazy Authentication
Observing that in the previous section, the results and proofs
are immediately published to registered users while a new
block is confirmed. In particular, even if there is no matching
result for a query, the mismatch proofs are still computed and
sent. This approach is good for real-time applications. For
applications that do not have such real-time requirements,
we propose a lazy authentication optimization, in which the
SP returns the result only when there is a matching object
(or the time since the last result has passed a threshold).
In this approach, the VO should prove that the current
object is a match and all other objects since the last result
mismatch the query. To achieve this, we may simply wait
for the matching result and invoke a time-window query
to compute the mismatch proofs on the fly. However, this
method can only generate the mismatch proofs for each
query separately and is incapable to take advantage of the
proofs shared by different subscription queries. Moreover,
this method leaves the burden of proofing all to the time
when there is a matching result. To address these issues, we
propose a new method that makes use of the inter-block
index to incrementally generating mismatch proofs.
Using the inter-block index to answer a subscription query
is completely different from doing that to a time-window
query. The reason is that we can back traverse the blockchain
and use the skip list to aggregate proofs in a time-window
query. However, we cannot do so for a subscription query
because new blocks are not yet available and we do not
know whether or not future objects will share the same mis-
match conditions. As such, we introduce a stack to facilitate
tracking the arrived blocks that share the same mismatch
conditions. The basic idea is to use the skip list to find the
maximum skip distance Li such that it coversm elements on
top of the stack. The AttDigests of these blocks are replaced
with AttDigestLi . Thanks to Construction 2 in Section 5.2,
the disjoint proofs can be aggregated online by invoking
ProofSum(·). For example, we have two mismatching blocki
and blocki−1 in the stack and there is a skip with distance 2.
Then, the SP can replace their proofs by an aggregate proof
computed from ProofSum(πi ,πi−1). In this way, the SP does
not need to compute the set disjoint proofs from scratch
when a matching result is found. The detailed procedure is
described in Algorithm 5.
8 SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section performs a security analysis on the multiset
accumulators and query authentication algorithms.
8.1 Analysis on Multiset Accumulators
We first present a formal definition of the security notion for
multiset accumulators and set disjoint proofs.
Definition 8.1 (Unforgeability [32]). We say a multiset ac-
cumulator is unforgeable if the success probability of any
polynomial-time adversary is negligible in the following ex-
periment:
• Run (sk,pk) ← KeyGen(1λ) and give the public key pk
to the adversary;
• The adversary outputs two multisets X1 and X2, along
with a set disjoint proof π .
We say the adversary succeeds if VerifyDisjoint(acc(X1),
acc(X2), π , pk) outputs 1 and X1 ∩ X2 , ∅.
This property ensures that the chance for a malicious SP
to forge a set disjoint proof is negligible, which serves as a
foundation for the security of our proposed query authentica-
tion algorithms. We now show that our constructions of the
accumulator indeed satisfy the desired security requirement.
Theorem 8.1. The constructions of the multiset accumula-
tor presented in Section 5.2 satisfy the security property of the
unforgeability as defined in Definition 8.1.
Proof. See Appendix B for a detailed proof. □
8.2 Analysis on Query Authentication
The formal definition of the unforgeability for our query
authentication algorithms is given below:
Definition 8.2 (Unforgeability). We say our proposed query
authentication algorithms are unforgeable if the success prob-
ability of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible in the
following experiment:
• Run the ADS generation and give all objects {oi } to the
adversary;
• The adversary outputs a query q (either time-window or
subscription query), a result R, and a VO;
We say the adversary succeeds if the VO passes the result
verification and one of the following results is true:
• R contains an object o∗ such that o∗ < {oi };
• R contains an object o∗ such that o∗ does not satisfy the
query q;
• There exists an object ox in the query time window or
subscription period, which is not in R but satisfies q.
This property ensures that the chance for a malicious SP
to forge an incorrect or incomplete result is negligible. We
can show that our proposed query authentication algorithms
indeed satisfy the desired security requirement.
Theorem 8.2. Our proposed query authentication algo-
rithms satisfy the security property of the unforgeability as
defined in Definition 8.2.
Proof. See Appendix C for a detailed proof. □
9 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the vChain
framework for time-window queries and subscription queries.
Three datasets are used in the experiments:
• Foursquare (4SQ) [46]: The 4SQ dataset contains 1M
data records, which are the user check-in information.
We pack the records within a 30s interval as a block
and each object has the form of ⟨timestamp, [lonдitude ,
latitude], {check-in place’s keywords}⟩. On average, each
record has 2 keywords.
• Weather (WX): The WX dataset contains 1.5M hourly
weather records for 36 cities in US, Canada, and Israeli
during 2012-2017.2 For each record, it contains seven
2https://www.kaggle.com/selfishgene/historical-hourly-weather-data/
numerical attributes (such as humidity and temperature)
and one weather description attribute with 2 keywords
on average. The records within the same hour interval
are packed as a block.
• Ethereum (ETH): The ETH transaction dataset is ex-
tracted from the Ethereum blockchain during the period
from Jan 15, 2017 to Jan 30, 2017.3 It contains 90,000
blocks with 1.12M transaction records. Each transac-
tion is in the form of ⟨timestamp, amount , {addresses}⟩,
where amount is the amount of Ether transferred and
{addresses} are the addresses of senders and receivers.
Most transactions have two addresses.
Note that the time intervals of the blocks in 4SQ,WX, and
ETH are roughly 30s, 1 hour, and 15s, respectively.
The query user is set up on a commodity laptop computer
with Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM, running on CentOS 7
with a single thread. The SP and the miner are set up on a
x64 blade server with dual Intel Xeon 2.67GHz, X5650 CPU
and 32 GB RAM, running on CentOS 7. The experiments are
written in C++ and the following libraries are used: MCL for
bilinear pairing computation,4 Flint for modular arithmetic
operations, Crypto++ for 160-bit SHA-1 hash operations, and
OpenMP for parallel computation. Also, the SP runs with 24
hyperthreads to accelerate the query processing.
To evaluate the performance of verifiable queries in vChain,
we mainly use three metrics: (i) query processing cost in
terms of SP CPU time, (ii) result verification cost in terms of
user CPU time, and (iii) size of the VO transmitted from the
SP to the user. For each experiment, we randomly generate
20 queries and report the average results. By default, we set
the selectivity of the numerical range to 10% (for 4SQ and
WX) and 50% (for ETH) and employ a disjunctive Boolean
function with a size of 3 (for 4SQ andWX) and 9 (for ETH).
For WX, two attributes are involved in each range predicate.
9.1 Setup Cost
Table 1 reports the miner’s setup cost, including the ADS
construction time and the ADS size. Three methods are com-
pared in our experiments: (i) nil: no index is used; (ii) intra:
only intra-block index is used; (iii) both: both intra- and in-
ter-block indexes are used, in which the size of SkipList in
the inter-block index is set to 5. Each method is implemented
with two different accumulator constructions (labelled with
acc1 and acc2) presented in Section 5.2. Thus, a total of six
schemes are evaluated in each experiment. As expected, the
ADS construction time of both is generally longer than those
of nil and intra, but still within 2s for most cases. Moreover,
compared with acc1, acc2 significantly reduces the construc-
tion time of both because it supports online aggregation
3https://www.ethereum.org/
4MCL: https://github.com/herumi/mcl/
Table 1: Miner’s Setup Cost
Dataset Acc nil intra both
T S T S T S
4SQ acc1 0.17 2.12 0.65 10.7 12.5 11.1
4SQ acc2 0.06 2.12 0.26 10.7 1.16 11.1
WX acc1 0.16 1.55 0.52 7.38 1.01 7.68
WX acc2 0.05 1.55 0.16 7.38 0.20 7.68
ETH acc1 0.01 0.55 0.07 2.60 0.87 2.93
ETH acc2 0.14 0.55 0.30 2.60 0.13 2.93
T: ADS construction time (s/block); S: ADS size (KB/block)
and hence can reuse the index of the previous block in con-
structing the inter-block index. Regarding the ADS size, it is
independent of the accumulator used and ranges from 2.6KB
to 11.1KB per block for different indexes and datasets.
We alsomeasure the space required by the user for running
a light node to maintain the block headers. For both nil and
intra, the size of each block header is 800 bits, regardless of
the dataset or accumulator. Due to the inter-block index, the
block header size of both is slightly increased to 960 bits.
9.2 Time-Window Query Performance
To evaluate the performance for time-window queries, we
vary the query window from 2 to 10 hours for 4SQ and ETH
and from 20 to 100 hours forWX. The results for the three
datasets are shown in Figs. 9–11, respectively. We make sev-
eral interesting observations. First, as expected, the indexes
substantially improve the performance in almost all metrics.
In particular, for the 4SQ and ETH datasets, the performance
of using the indexes is at least 2X better than that with the
same accumulator but without using any index. This is be-
cause the objects in these two datasets share less similarity
and hence benefit more from using the indexes for pruning.
Second, the costs of the index-based schemes increase only
sublinearly with enlarging the query window. This is partic-
ularly true in terms of the user CPU time for the index-based
schemes using acc2, which supports batch verification of
mismatches (see Section 6.3). Third, comparing intra and
both, both is always no worse than intra except concerning
the SP CPU time for the 4SQ dataset. On the one hand, this
indicates the effectiveness of using the inter-block index. On
the other hand, the reason of both being worse than intra in
SP CPU time is mainly because in an inter-block index-based
scheme, larger multisets are used as the input of a set dis-
joint proof, which increases the SP CPU time. More insight
on this is provided in Appendix D.3, where we examine the
impact of SkipList size. The biggest improvement of both
over intra is observed for the ETH dataset. The reason is as
follows. Compared with 4SQ, the similarity shared among
the objects in ETH is lower; compared with WX, ETH has
less objects contained in each block. For both cases, more
performance improvement is gained from using the skip list
in the inter-block index.
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Figure 9: Time-Window Query Performance (4SQ)
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Figure 12: Subscription Query with IP-Tree Index
9.3 Subscription Query Performance
We next evaluate the performance for subscription queries.
First, we examine the SP’s query processing time with or
without using the IP-Tree (denoted as ip and nip) under
the default setting with both intra- and inter-block indexes
enabled. We randomly generate different numbers of queries.
We set the default subscription period as 2 hours for 4SQ and
ETH and 20 hours forWX. As shown in Fig. 12, the IP-Tree
reduces the SP’s overhead by at least 50% in all cases tested.
The performance gain in the ETH dataset (Fig. 12(c)) is more
substantial thanks to the sparser distribution of the data.
To compare real-time and lazy authentications, we con-
sider two real-time schemes (with acc1 and acc2) and one
lazy scheme (with acc2 only, as acc1 does not support the
aggregation of accumulative sets and proofs). We vary the
subscription period from 2 hours to 10 hours for 4SQ and
ETH and 20 hours to 100 hours forWX. Figs. 13–15 show the
results of varying the subscription period. Clearly, the lazy
scheme performs much better than the real-time schemes in
terms of the user CPU time. Furthermore, the CPU time and
the VO size in the lazy scheme are increased only sub-linearly
with increasing the subscription period. This is because the
lazy scheme can aggregate the proofs of mismatching objects
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Figure 15: Subscription Query Performance (ETH)
across blocks. In contrast, the real-time schemes compute all
the proofs immediately upon arrival of a new block, result-
ing in a worse performance. In terms of the SP CPU time,
as the lazy scheme needs to sacrifice the SP’s computation
to aggregate mismatch proofs, its performance is generally
worse than the real-time schemes when using the same ac-
cumulator.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied, for the first time in the lit-
erature, the problem of verifiable query processing over
blockchain databases. We proposed the vChain framework
to ensure the integrity of Boolean range queries for light-
weight users. We developed a novel accumulator-based ADS
scheme that transforms numerical attributes into set-valued
attributes and hence enables dynamic aggregation over ar-
bitrary query attributes. Based on that, two data indexes,
namely tree-based intra-block index and skip-list-based inter-
block index, and one prefix-tree-based index for subscription
queries were designed, along with a series of optimizations.
While our proposed framework has been shown to be prac-
tically implementable, the robustness of the proposed tech-
niques was substantiated by security analysis and empirical
results.
This paper opens up a new direction for blockchain re-
search. There are a number of interesting research problems
that deserve further investigation, e.g., how to support more
complex analytics queries; how to leverage modern hard-
ware such as multi- and many-cores to scale performance;
and how to address privacy concerns in query processing.
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Algorithm 6: IP-Tree Construction (by the SP)
Function BuildIPTree({query})
Input: All subscription queries {query}
root .дrid ← FullRanдe;
Create an empty queue queue;
queue .enqueue(⟨root , {query}⟩);
while queue is not empty do
⟨node, {queryn }⟩ ← queue .dequeue();
for qi in {queryn } do
if qi full covers node .дrid then
Add ⟨qi , full⟩ to node .RCIF ;
else Add ⟨qi , partial⟩ to node .RCIF ;
Build node .BCIF from fully cover queries;
for sub_д in Split(node .дrid) do
sub_n.дrid ← sub_д;
sub_q ← {q | node .RCIF [q] =
partial ∧ intersect(q, sub_д)};
queue .enqueue(⟨sub_n, {sub_q}⟩);
node .children.add(sub_n);
[46] D. Yang, D. Zhang, and B. Qu. 2015. Participatory cultural mapping
based on collective behavior in location based social networks. ACM
Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology.
A PSEUDO CODES OF THE IP-TREE
ALGORITHMS
Algorithms 6 and 7 respectively show the construction and
query processing algorithms of the IP-tree index introduced
in Section 7.
B PROOF OF THEOREM 8.1
Theorem 8.1. The constructions of the multiset accumula-
tor presented in Section 5.2 satisfy the security property of the
unforgeability as defined in Definition 8.1.
Proof. We omit the proof of this theorem for the first
construction of the multiset accumulator in Section 5.2, as it
has been shown to hold under the q-SDH assumption in [32].
We prove this theorem holds for the second construction
by contradiction. Support that there is an adversary who
outputs two multisets X1 and X2, where X1 ∩ X2 , ∅, and a
valid set disjoint proof π . This means that
e(dA(X1),dB (X2)) = e(π ,д) ⇒
e(дA(X1),дB(X2)) = e(π ,д) ⇒
e(д,д)A(X1)B(X2) = e(π ,д) ⇒
π = дA(X1)B(X2)
On the other hand, because X1 ∩ X2 , ∅, we can get Csq ∈
A(X1)B(X2), where C is a non-zero constant. That is,
A(X1)B(X2) = Csq + Q(s), where Q(s) is some polynomial
Algorithm 7: Subscription Query w. Intra-Index (by the SP)
Function SubscriptionIPTree(rIP, IntraRoot)
Input: IP-Tree root rIP, Intra-Index root IntraRoot
Create an empty queue queue1;
Q ← {};
queue1.enqueue(⟨IntraRoot ,Q⟩);
while queue1 is not empty do
⟨node,Q⟩ ← queue1.dequeue();
Q ← QueryIntraNode(rIP,node,Q);
for n in node .children do queue1.enqueue(⟨n,Q⟩);
Function QueryIntraNode(rIP,nintra,Q)
Input: IP-Tree root rIP, Intra-Index node nintra, processed
mismatching queries Q
Output: processed mismatching queries Q
Create an empty queue queue2 and enqueue rIP;
while queue2 is not empty do
n ← queue2.dequeue();
qf ← {q |n.RCIF [q] = full}\Q ;
for ⟨ϒ,qs⟩ in n.BCIF do
if nintra.W ∩ ϒ = ∅ then
π ← ProveDisjoint(nintra.W , ϒ,pk);
Add ⟨π , ϒ⟩ to q.VO ∀q ∈ (qf ∩ qs)\Q ;
Q ← Q ∪ (qf ∩ qs);
if nintra is leaf node then
Add nintra.o to q.R for q ∈ qf \Q ;
q′ ← {};
for n′ in n.children do
if n′ intersects nintra then q′ ← q′ ∪ n′.queries;
qp ← {q |n.RCIF [q] = partial}\q′;
for n′ in n.children do
if n′ intersects nintra then queue2.enqueu(n′) ;
else
qs ← qp ∩ n′.queries\Q ;
W ′ ← trans(n′.дrid);
π ← ProveDisjoint(nintra.W ,W ′,pk);
Add ⟨π ,W ′⟩ to q.VO ∀q ∈ qs;
Q ← Q ∪ qs;
return Q ;
without the sq term. Therefore, the adversary can get
π = дA(X1)B(X2) = дCs
q · дQ (s) ⇒
дs
q
= (π/дQ (s))C
−1
which violates the q-DHE assumption. Therefore, by contra-
diction, the theorem holds. □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 8.2
Theorem 8.2. Our proposed query authentication algo-
rithms satisfy the security property of the unforgeability as
defined in Definition 8.2.
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction.
Case 1: The resultR contains an objecto∗ such thato∗ < {oi }.
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Figure 16: Comparison with MHT
Recall that in the result verification procedure, the veri-
fier will check the integrity of the object with respect to the
MerkleRoot stored in the blockchain. Therefore, a success-
ful forge means either a collision of the underlying crypto-
graphic hash function, or a break of the blockchain protocol,
which yields a contradiction.
Case 2: The result R contains an object o∗ such that o∗ does
not satisfy the query q.
It is trivial to see that such a case is impossible, as the
verifier will check it locally.
Case 3: There exists an object ox in the query window
or subscription period, which is not in R but satisfies the
query q.
First, note that the verifier (running a light node) syncs
block headers with the blockchain network. Thus, the veri-
fier always verifies the results with respect to the latest block
header. Now suppose there is a missing object ox . During ver-
ification, the verifier will examine the multiset accumulative
values which cover the whole query window or subscription
period. The missing object ox must fall under one multiset ac-
cumulative value in the VO. As discussed in Section 5.1, such
a missing object implies that the attribute of this matching
object intersects with the equivalent multiset of some part
of the query condition. This means that the adversary is able
to construct two multisets X1 and X2, such that X1 ∩X2 , ∅,
along with a corresponding set disjoint proof, which contra-
dicts to Theorem 8.1. □
D SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERIMENT
RESULTS
This section presents some supplemental experiment results.
D.1 Comparison with MHT
As mentioned in Section 5, one major drawback of the tradi-
tional MHT-based solution is its prohibitively high overhead
to support queries involving arbitrary attributes for multi-
dimensional databases. To demonstrate that, we synthesize
several datasets with different dimensionalities using the
WX dataset and experimentally compare the MHT solution
with our accumulator-based solutions in terms of the setup
cost. Note that the original weather description attribute is
removed from the synthetic datasets, since MTHs cannot
work with set-valued attributes. As shown in Fig. 16(a), the
construction time of our solutions is only slightly increased
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Figure 17: Impact of Selectivity (4SQ)
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Figure 18: Impact of Selectivity (WX)
0
10
20
30
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
SP
 C
PU
 T
im
e 
(s)
Selectivity of Numerical Range
acc1
acc2
0.01
0.1
1
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Us
er
 C
PU
 T
im
e 
(s)
Selectivity of Numerical Range
acc1
acc2
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
VO
 S
ize
 (K
B)
Selectivity of Numerical Range
acc1
acc2
Figure 19: Impact of Selectivity (ETH)
with dimensionality. In contrast, the MHT construction time
is dramatically increased because it needs to build an MHT
for every combination of attributes. Furthermore, to examine
the ADS overhead, we show the average size of the ADS-
embedded blocks in Fig. 16(b) (normalized by the original
block size, plotted in log scale). While our solutions have a
negligible fixed-size ADS regardless of data dimensionality,
the space overhead incurred by MTH grows exponentially
with dimensionality. In particular, when the dimensionality
is higher than 3, the MHT’s ADS overhead is more than
10X–1,000X the original block size, which is unacceptable
for practical use since the ADS would dominate the traffic
and storage cost of a blockchain network.
D.2 Impact of Selectivity
Figs. 17–19 show the time-window query performance by
varying the selectivity of the range predicate from 10% to
50%. The window size is fixed at 10 hours for 4SQ and ETH
and at 100 hours for WX. Both the intra-block and inter-
block indexes are enabled. For all datasets, the SP CPU time
is generally decreased with increasing selectivity. This is
because the SP query processing time is dominated by the
proving of mismatching objects. As a result, the more the
objects selected, the less is the SP overhead. In contrast, the
user CPU time remains largely the same under different
settings. As for the VO size, it is slightly increased because of
a larger number of hashes introduced by more query results.
Overall, we can see that our solution performs efficiently
under a wide range of selectivity settings.
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Figure 20: Impact of SkipList Size (4SQ)
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Figure 21: Impact of SkipList Size (WX)
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Figure 22: Impact of SkipList Size (ETH)
D.3 Impact of SkipList
This section investigates the impact of SkipList in the inter-
block index. We set the query windows size the same as
in Appendix D.2. The size of SkipList is varied from 0 to
5. Note that a size of zero means that we employ only an
intra-block index but no inter-block index. For the other
settings, both the intra-block and inter-block indexes are
employed. Figs. 20–22 show the results for the three datasets,
respectively. It is interesting to observe that the SP CPU time
exhibits different trends for different datasets. This can be
explained as follows. On the one hand, the SkipList helps
aggregate mismatch proofs across consecutive blocks. With
an increased size of SkipList, more mismatch proofs can be
aggregated without accessing the actual blocks; hence the
SP CPU time is reduced and a smaller VO is resulted. On the
other hand, the larger the SkipList, the more set elements will
be added up as the input of the accumulator, which increases
the SP CPU time. Furthermore, the effectiveness of using
SkipList for aggregating mismatch proofs depends on the
distribution of the data. The combination of these factors
contributes to the final SP CPU time. As a result, we observe
fluctuations in SP CPU time for 4SQ andWX but a steady de-
crease in ETH when the SkipList size increases. Nevertheless,
the user CPU time and the VO size are both monotonically
reduced thanks to the aggregation of mismatching objects
by the inter-block index. Comparing acc1 and acc2, since
acc2 can support online aggregation, its VO size and also
user CPU time are further reduced compared with those of
acc1 in all cases tested.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.0;
2
3 contract vChainContract {
4 struct BlockHeader {
5 bytes32 PreBkHash;
6 bytes32 MerkleRoot;
7 bytes32 SkipListRoot;
8 }
9 struct Block {
10 BlockHeader header;
11 IntraIndex intraindex;
12 InterIndex interindex;
13 Object [] objects;
14 }
15 // stores each block
16 mapping(bytes32=>Block) chainstorage;
17
18 function BuildvChain(Object [] _objects ,
19 bytes32 _PreBkHash) public {
20 Block block;
21 BlockHeader _header;
22 _header.PreBkHash = _PreBkHash;
23 (_header.MerkleRoot , block.intraindex) =
BuildIntraIndex(_objects);
24 (_header.SkipListRoot , block.interindex) =
BuildInterIndex(chainstorage);
25 bytes32 _currentBkHash = sha3(_header);
26 block.objects = _objects;
27 block.header = _header;
28 chainstorage[_currentBkHash] = block;
29 }
30 }
Listing 1: Implementing vChain in Smart Contract
E PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
This section addresses the practical implementation issues of
our proposed vChain framework. Since we need to com-
pute an ADS and embed it into each block, the existing
blockchains cannot be used directly. There are two possible
solutions. First, we can develop a new chain by extending
an open-source blockchain project. Second, we can leverage
smart contracts, trusted programs running on blockchains,
to build a logical chain that constructs and maintains the
ADS for each block, on top of an existing blockchain (e.g.,
Ethereum [2] or Hyperledger [26]). The advantage of the
second solution is that we do not need to be bothered by
the underlying system implementation, but focus on writing
smart contracts to build the logical chain. Listing 1 shows
an example of Ethereum smart contract that implements the
vChain framework. Specifically, lines 4–14 define the struc-
tures of a block header and a block. The mapping structure,
chainstorage, indexes each block with the block hash (line 16).
The function BuildvChain first constructs the block header,
including the intra-block index and the inter-block index
(lines 22–24). Then, the block hash is computed (line 25) and,
together with the input objects, assigned to the current block
(lines 26–27). Finally, the newly constructed block is added
to the chainstorage using its block hash (line 28).
